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I. Introduction
It is well known that very few manufactured (as opposed to primary) commodities
are traded on organized exchanges. It is also well understood that the heterogeneity of
manufactures along the dimensions of both characteristics and quality interferes with the
ability of their prices to signal relative scarcity. I claim that this uninformativeness of
prices prevents “globally scanning” traders from substituting for organized exchanges in
mat thing international buyers and sellers of differentiated products. Instead connections
between sellers and buyers are made through a search process that because of its costliness
does not proceed until the best match is achieved. This search is strongly conditioned by
proximity and preexisting “ties” and restits in trading networks rather than “markets”. 1
This view helps us to understand a puzzling relationship between the volume of
trade and distance between trading partners that appears once one extends the sample of
countries in a gravity model beyond the OECD to a larger set of 63 countries examined by
Frankel and co-authors in a series of papers on trading blocs (e.g., Frankel, Stein, and Wei
1993). Looking across commodities, one does not observe a more negative impact of
distance between trading partners on the volume of trade as transportation costs increase
as a percentage of value, The explanation of this puzzle offered by the network/search
view of trade is that, due to their heterogeneity, low transport cost commodities are traded
through networks while high transport cost commodities either have organized exchanges
or reference prices that facilitate international commodity arbitrage. z This explanation is
lPart of the cost of establishing a connection between a seller and a buyer may be mutual
adaptation: the seller refines his product to better suit the preferences of the buyer and the
buyer (especially if a firm rather than an ultimate consumer) adapts his specifications to
the capabilities of the seller (see Egan and Mody 1992). Gereffi (1994) has especially
emphasized the role of large first-world buyers in identifying and “shaping” third-world
sellers. Within a given industry (e.g., footwear) one can imagine a continuum from sellers
producing a completely specified product and then finding buyers to sellers finding buyers
and then producing a product tailored to their specifications. The end result in terms of
the impact of distance and “ties” on trade is the same.
zIn passing we may note that the network view helps us to understand the high proportion
of international trade that is int rafirm: the connections between sellers and buyers are
“built -in”. Brtinard (1993) finds for her sample of 64 industries that for the United States2
investigated empirically by Rauch (1996),
Wtile Rauch(1996) explores theconsequences of thenetwork/search tiewat a
macro level by examining world trade flows, the purpose of the present paper is to explore
the consequences of this view at a micro level by examining trade behavior, institutions,
and policies in a partial equilibrium context. The next section contrasts the
network/search view with the standard monopolistic competition approach to trade in
differentiated products. Section III sets up a simple partial equilibrium search model based
on models used in labor economics. Sections IV-VI respectively show how this search
model can help us to understand the role of “social capital” in international trade, the
viability of general trading companies such as Japan’s sogo shosha, and the rationale for
ubiquitous export promotion policies such as subsidized trade missions. The concluding
section suggests areas for further empirical and theoretical research.
II. The network/search view vmns the international market model of trade in
differentiated products
In the international trade literature there are two different models of product
differentiation. In the “ided product” model, products vary because they combine certain
underl~ng characteristics in different bundles and each user (consumer or producer) has
some different best combination in mind. In the “love-of-variety” model, different product
varieties enter symmetrically into a CES utility or production function so that the
consumer or producer uses many different varieties simultaneously rather than choosing the
one that is closest to her ideal. The ideal product model is the only one that I will use here
(for an example of its direct application to international trade data see Feenstra 1988).
The standard approach to modeling international trade in differentiated products is
to assume monopolistic competition equilibrium. An implicit assumption of the
the share of both imports and exports accounted for by intrafirm transfers is roughly equal
to one-quarter.3
monopolistic competition model as it has been applied to international trade is that any
supplier, foreign or domestic, is automatically matched to the buyer(s) to whose ideal(s) its
product is closest (see, e.g., Helpman 1981), s In terms of Figure la, all sellers and buyers
are connected to an abstract “international market”, a black box that serves to costlessly
mat ch buyers to sellers. Perhaps a fictitious market is a serviceable assumption for trade
within a country, where one can imagine that buyers are informed at nominal cost of all
available varieties and their characteristics and sellers are well aware of how to reach the
buyers that form their particular market niches, It is, I argue, not serviceable for
international trade, where buying agents for consumer goods distributors and firms seeking
inputs to production processes incur considerable costs in discovering the foreign varieties
available and their characteristics, as well as the capabilities oft he suppliers of these
varieties, and sellers incur considerable costs in finding buying agents or intermediate goods
demanders that are good matches for the variety they have to offer. As Swedish Trade
Council export consultant Kent Goldmam (quoted in Nothdurft 1992, p. 32) stated of his
clients that are marginal or failed exporters, “Sometimes their product isn’t right for the
market, or the country they chose was not a good fit, or their approach or agents are not
right .“ International trade in differentiated products, I argue, is more appropriately
described by Figure lb, where buyers and sellers become individually connected as the end
product of a search process and may be ignorant of many buyers or sellers to which they
are not connected.
While the situation depicted in Figure lb might typically be described as an
“unorganized market”, I prefer to use the term “network”. I eschew the term “market” to
highlight the fact that trading behavior in Figure lb is qualitatively different than trading
behavior in Figure la and not just an approximation to it. In particular, the “anonymity”
sThis automatic matching is of course a consequence of the assumption of perfect
information. One can interpret what I present here and in Rauch (1996) as evidence that
the assumption of perfect information is more damaging to our ability to understand trade
in differentiated products than to our ability to understand trade in homogeneous products.4
characteristic of market transactions permits commodity arbitrage between distant and
unrelated parties while net works are distinguished by the import ante of personal cent acts
that are facilitated by proximity and common language. I choose the term “network” to
indicate an affinity with the branch of sociology called “network analysis”; a concrete
example of this affinity will be given in section IV below. I argue below that the change to
a network/search perspective allows one to understand phenomena that cannot be
understood within the fictitious international market framework: the importance of “ties”
(e.g., ethnic, extended family) in trade, the success of diversified trading intermediaries
such as Japan’s sogo shosha, and the ubiquity of government export promotion policies
such as subsidized trade missions. Clearly other potential explanations exist for all of these
phenomena, some of which undoubtedly account for part of what we observe, yet I hope to
demonstrate that the network/search
them.
view can nevertheless provide new insight into all of
III. A partial equilibritun model of search and international trade in differentiated
products
The purpose of this section is
trade in differentiated products that
effects of social capital, sogo shosha,
to create a partial equilibrium model of international
will serve to build intuition concerning the qualitative
and spillovers discussed in sections IV, V, and VI,
respectively. The model is analogous to models in labor economics where workers search
for the jobs that best match their abilities. q It admits of a graphical solution that is
similar to a “reservation match”,
Let us assume that a firm develops its variety of a differentiated product to suit a
niche in its home market. (The fact that this assumption seems natural already indicates
lSimilarly, Okun (1981, Chapter 4) argued that what he called “customer markets” (as
opposed to “auction markets”) had many similarities to labor markets. His concern was
with “price stickiness” and macroeconomic fluctuations rather than international trade.5
an incomplete information structure where information about buyers is mediated by
distance.) The firm then tries to find foreign buyers for this variety, as opposed to
developing a new vanet y for whatever foreign buyers it finds. The real world actually
displays a mixture of both of these kinds of behavior. Nothdurft (1992, p. 63) notes that,
“A recent European Commission study, for example, found that even among successful
frequent exporters, only half of the firms surveyed tailored products to market
specifications. ”
Within an industry, each firm produces its variety under conditions of locally
constant unit cost. As is well known, globally constant unit cost would lead to customized
production, eliminating the gains from trade that result from consumers or producers being
able to purchase products closer to their ideals (i.e., the gains from trade not based on
aut arky cost differentials). Thus unit cost must be decreasing at sufficiently small levels of
output, The purpose of the locally constant unit cost assumption is to prevent firms’
average costs from changing when they expand into foreign markets, so that their profits
horn domestic sales are also unchanged.
The firm searches for the foreign buyer whose preferences
characteristics and quality best match the variety it has to offer,
complicated by the fact that it can search across many countries
entry), each of which in general will differ regarding search costs
among various product
Its problem is
(even many ports of
per unit time and
regarding how “close” and cost competitive the closest domestic substitutes are. I will
simplify this problem by collapsing all the dimensions along which products can vary into
one, and all the countries (ports of entry) into one. I thus assume there is a one-to-one
correspondence between potential product vaneties and points on the real line, that there is
a known distribution of buyers F(x) along the real line, and that search takes place in
discrete time at a constant cost c per period. Foreign competitors are assumed to all
charge the same price so that the firms that are most competitive with the searching firm
are always the two that produce the varieties that are closest to its variety on the real line.6
Figure 2 shows the portion of the red line where the searching firm’s variety,
denoted by X*, and those of its closest foreign competitors, denoted by xl and X2, are
located. The vertical dimension of the figure shows the potential gains from trade or
surplus generated by a match between the searching firm and a buyer as a function of the
latter’s ideal product. The graph implicitly assumes that buyers do not differ along any
dimension other than ideal product; e.g., they are all the same size. If all three supplier
firms are charging the same price then obviously any potential buyer that is aware of all
three will make its purchase from the firm that is producing the variety closest to its ideal
product. For the time being let us assume not only that both foreign competitors are
charging the same price, but that the searching firm’s unit cost is the same as that price.
(x* - xl)/2 and at In this case potential gains from trade clearly fall to zero at x* -
x* + (X2 - x*)/2. The surplus also clearly declines when the buyer is getting closer to the
nearest competitor and farther from the searching firm. Bet ween x* and (xl + x2)/2 the
buyer gets farther from both the searching firm and its nearest competitor as its ideal type
moves to the right; I assume that surplus declines monotonically in this region so that
there is a unique mtimum at x*.
The remaining assumptions follow the standard search model of labor economics
(see, e.g., Sargent 1987, Chapter 2). In particular, buyers are passive’ (only sellers search)
and there is no learning in the sense that previous searches offer no guidance as to “where”
to search next. In any period the firm can accept its current match forever or reject it and
search again for a new buyer with which it can match next period, so that acceptance of
the match yields m(x)/(1 - d), where b is the firm’s discount factor. I assume that the
firm’s per period profit from the match, fix), is an increasing function of the realizable
surplus (see Figure 3). Let V(xt) be the expected value of X~_Ofit~x) for a firm with —
current mat ch Xt. Bellman’s functional equation is
sSome consequences of relaxing this assumption are discussed briefly in the concluding
section of this paper.7
V(xt)=max{o, fixt)/(l - J), JJ:mv(x)dF(x) -c}.
The solution for V(xt ) is given by the heavy line plotted in Figure 3. It is implicit
in Figure 3 that c is not so large relative to J/v(x) dF(x) that no search (no trade) is
optimal. We see that the firm accepts any match in the interval (x,i). It should be noted
in passing that the situation depicted in Figure 3, where search is profitable (in
expect at ion), allows us to understand the commonplace expression of interest in “finding
new markets” in the int ernat iond business press, an int crest that cannot be understood
within either the perfectly competitive or monopolistically competitive models of
international trade.
Let us now briefly consider the case where the given firm’s unit cost differs from the
price charged by its nearest foreign competitors. I consider the case where its unit cost is
lower, since this is presumably more typical of an exporting firm; the case where its unit
cost is higher can be treated symmetrically. Clearly there now exist potential gains from
trade even when the firm is matched with buyers that are “closer” to the competition, and
indeed the entire plot of the surplus in Figure 2 must be shifted upwards, raising the plot of
~xt)/(l - b) in Figure 3 as well. But we might expect J~v(x)dF(x) - c to increase more
because c remains constant, paradoxically narrowing the range of acceptable matches even
though the range of matches that yield positive surplus has widened. The intuition is that
the profit from a given match has increased relative to the cost of search, thereby making
firms more willing to reject bad matches.
IV. Search and social capital
The work of Putnam (1993) has led to a surge of interest in the concept of “social
capital” (now two decades old), which he describes (1994) as “features of social
organizations, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and
cooperation for mutual benefit. ” Here I will use the concept to refer to what sociologists
call “ties” that are used to exchange information. The effects of such ties have been8
extensively studied in connection with job search, for which Montgomery (1991, p. 1408)
summarizes the evidence from the literature with the stat ement that “approximately 50
percent of all workers cmrently employed found their jobs through friends and relatives. ”
While there is a fairly rich anecdotal and descriptive literature on the role of
extended family and ethnic ties in international trade, to my knowledge Gould (1994) has
done the only econometric study quantifying some of these effects. He finds that
immigration to the United States increases U. S. bilateral trade with the immigrants’
countries of origin, that this “immigrant-link effect” is stronger for U. S. exports than for
U. S. imports, and that the effect on exports exhausts itself for a much smaller number of
immigrants than does the effect on imports, Taken together these results indicate that the
most important effect of immigration on trade is through the establishment of business
contacts, with a secondary effect through increased U. S. preferences for goods produced in
the country of origin, Gould also notes (p. 310) that when he disaggregates total trade into
trade in consumer and producer goods, “The immigrant information variable does not
appear to be important in the producer imports equation. ” His explanation of this finding
is completely consistent with my argument in this paper: “Because producer goods tend to
be the least differentiated products (for instance, scrap metal) across countries, trade flows
in these products may not benefit much from country-specific information. ”
The anecdotal and descriptive literature on international trade has mainly
emphasized how business contacts established through ethnic or extended family ties can
resolve the problem of trust in international transactions (e.g., Curtin 1984). Yet clearly
such ties can also be important as a source of information about potential buyers (or
sellers). Kotkin (1992) states that “Chinese entrepreneurs remain, in essence, arbitrageurs,
their widespread dispersion a critical means of identifying prime business opportunities” (p,
169) and “most of Hong Kong’s Indian businesses--from the tiny two-man operation to the
giant conglomerate--fit the classical mold, with extended families providing the linkages
between various national markets” (p. 219). A good example of how the Hong Kong Indian9
net work works to identify buyers is the following story (p. 201):
Like millions of other Indian emigrants, [Gulu] Lalvani never went home.
Shortly after arriving in Leeds, he met a pair of Jewish brothers named
Rosenbaum who were selling costume jewelry and seemed to be making good
money at it. Intrigued, Gulu and his brother Pratap took out a loan and
bought some ersatz pearl necklaces through family contacts in Hong Kong,
which they sold to the Rosenbaums at a handsome profit. Soon the Lalvanis
were selling to the Jewish wholesalers down in London, taking in orders of up
to 60,000 pounds at a single swoop.
In short, cross-border ties are important not only as a foundation for trust but also as a
source of free information: in terms of Figure 3, one will accept a buyer about which one is
informed for free rather than search if the buyer lies in the interval (x,X). On the other
hand, if all firms are matched automatically to their ideal buyers as in the monopolistic
competition model, than free information supplied through ties is unimportant.
The network/search view of international trade in differentiated products also has
implications for the import ante of ties within a country. The role of such ties in promoting
information sharing is increasingly appreciated, Discussing the Sines Valley region of
Brazil, the origin of over 80 percent of the country’s footwear exports, Schmitz (1995, p.
21) reports that “non-economic ties bet ween actors do seem to play a major role. Some are
to do with ethnicity (being of German descent); others with geography (being local); or
kinship. ” The “diffusion of information and ideas” between these tied entrepreneurs
“occurs not only in business transactions, but also at social gatherings of friends, family,
sports club, neighborhood or church” (p. 12). Investigators of industrial districts such as
Schmitz have mainly been interested in sharing of technological information, while the
importance of ties for marketing has been relatively overlooked. In particular, the benefits
of exchange of information concerning foreign buyers emerge clearly from the model of the
previous section. Consider two firms with equal unit costs whose entrepreneurs are “tied”.
One firm is identified by x* in Figure 3 and the other firm lies anywhere outside the
interval [xl ,X2], For example, firm 1 may specialize in women’s shoes while firm 2
specializes in men’s shoes. Under these circumstances the acceptance intervals of the two10
firms will not overlap. If firm l'sentrepreneur then contacts aforeign buyer who turns out
to be more interested in men’s than women’s shoes, he will be willing to pass this
information on to firm 2‘s entrepreneur, and vice-versa. H In effect, then, in every period
each firm gets two independent draws from the distribution F(x) rather than one, until one
firm accepts a match. It follows that their “tie” raises V(xt) for both firms. Moreover,
adding ties can only raise V(xt) still further. Indeed, it is possible that a
country -industr y’s stock of social capital as I have defined it here could make the
difference between its participation and non-participation in international trade: it could
be that no firm will find a search for foreign buyers worthwhile on its own, but many firms
will find this search worthwhile if they search mutually.
Matters become more complex when the firm to which firm x* is tied lies within the
interval [X1,X2]. This cotid be a common occurence when a country is densely supplied in
a particular part of characteristics space, i.e., when products with a particular constellation
of characteristics are a regional/national specidt y (e.g., “stout” beers from Ireland). In
this case the acceptance intervals of the tied firms may overlap, creating a subinterval of
matches for which they will not share information. Such a tie will typically not raise V(xt)
as much as the type described in the preceding paragraph, the exception being when the
more “distant” tied firm is located in a very favorable part of the distribution and is likely
to find an acceptable match very quickly. This advantage of distant ties over “close” ties
is another example of what Granovetter (1973) called “the strength of weak ties” in
connection with job search: ties with those who are more “distant” from you (e. g., friends
made during your previous employment rather than your current employment) and with
whom your relationship may be less intense (”weaker”) because of less frequent cent act can
prove more valuable because there is less overlap between the information they possess and
HThis could occur among the wholesalers that represent the firms rather than among the
firms themselves. I observed this behavior in the garment district of New York City,
where wholesalers routinely referred to their competitors customers whom they thought
would be int crested in their competitors’ lines.11
the information you possess.
V. Search and Sogo Shosha
A natural reaction to the analysis of the previous section is that even in the absence
of social capital, traders (export firms) should emerge to organize “untied” producers in
order to take advantage of the economies of scope that exist in the search process.
However, this line of thinking neglects to take account of the fact that implicit in the
notion of “tie” is familiarity with the characteristics and capabilities of the agent to which
one is tied. T Thus in the employment search context one can recommend one’s friend for a
job because one knows him well enough to know whether he will be a good match for the
position.
A trading firm that wishes to capitalize on economies of scope in the search for
foreign buyers must therefore make an initial investment in thorough knowledge of its
clients. This puts it at a cost disadvantage relative to the client’s own search, a
disadvantage that can ordy be overcome (if at all) by having a large enough number of
clients to generate econoties of scope sufficient to offset this cost disadvantage.
Understanding this benefit from size is, I believe, a first step towards understanding the
success of Japan’s general trading companies, known as sogo shosha. 8 Yoshino and Lifson
(1986, p. 7) describe sogo shosha as “large-scale diversified intermediaries” with “some
characteristics of both vertically integrated firm and market”. Of their operation in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Yoshino and Lifson (p. 23) state:
7A wholesaler in the New York City garment district, explaining to me why he had found
referrals such a useful means of expanding his customer base, said that people who
recommend you “know what you’re about. ”
sMany other explanations for the success of the sogo shosha have been offered in the
literature. For example, Sheard (1992) argues that the sogo shosha compensate for
Japanese capital market imperfections by implicitly insuring against default on trade
credit, a risk they can diversify through their “generality”. Here I am attempting to
identify a basis for success that can extend to any economy whether or not it shares
Japan’s characteristics, and thus help us understand the experience of other countries that
are attempting to imitate the sogo shosha.12
Particularly import ant ... was the role the sogo shosha played in providing
export opportunities for the myriad small Japanese firms in cottage industries,
which, like their counterparts in developing countries today, faced many
problems in trying to break into the world market. The sogo shosha fed them
market information, helped them design products, extended credit, and, most
import ant, developed foreign outlets for their products.
In 1975 the South Korean government stimulated the creation of general trading companies
in imitation of the sogo shosha. One can get some idea of the size and importance of the
Japanese and Korean general trading companies from figures compiled by Lee (1987). In
1985, Japan’s top nine general trading companies handled 45 percent of Japan’s total
exports, while Korea’s top seven general trading companies handled 47.9 percent of all
Korean exports. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that Sung (1991) essentially argues
that the dense network of traders in Hong Kong functions like a general trading company
for mainland China. The share of Hong Kong imports from China for re-export in total
Chinese exports had climbed to 41.3 percent by 1989 (Table 7.6, pp. 144-5). Sung also
breaks down the Hong Kong re-export share of Chinese exports by one-digit SITC
commodity groupings (Table 7.8, pp. 148- 149), and his figures show a clear tendency for
Hong Kong’s share to increase with the degree of product differentiation. In 1987 (the last
year for which this breakdown is available), when the Hong-Kong re-export share of total
Chinese exports was only 21,9 percent, this share was 28.5 percent for manufactures (SITC
6-9) and 49.5 percent for machinery (SITC 7) compared to 10.7 percent for food and crude
materials (SITC O-4) and 18.2 percent for the intermediately differentiated category of
Chemicals (SITC 5).
The argument presented in this section so far can explain only the size of the
general trading companies, not their diversification. Indeed, since these economies of scope
are also available to traders that specialize in only one industry, ghow can the general
trading companies compete? At best they can ordy equal the specialized traders in
gThe role of specialized Taiwanese shoe trading companies in matching Taiwanese
manufacturers to foreign buyers “in accordance with the specialties of individual factories”
is well documented by Hsing (forthcoming, p. 57).13
industry-specific knowledge of how best to handle customs and documentation, liability
and other trade laws, shipping, etc., while the specialized traders will clearly have lower
overhead. The answer, I believe, is that through diversification across industries the
general trading companies can realize additional economies of scope not available to
specialized traders, The following quotation from Jameson (1994) concerning the
second-largest sogo shosha is revealing in this connection: “Mitsui, for example, formerly
divided its operations into product-line divisions. ‘But when the number of divisions
reached 80, it became apparent we were losing sight of the overall picture,’ company
President Naohiko Kumagti told the newspaper Asahi. The divisions were reorganized into
20 headquarters ‘to broaden horizontal cent acts,’ he said. ” Horizontal contacts across
industries may be especially useful when handling buying as well as selling clients. For
example, suppose a general trading company has as clients a firm in an intermediate goods
industry that sells to producers in a certain capital goods industry and a firm in a final
goods industry that purchases the output of this capital goods industry. The company can
conduct one search for foreign buyers/sellers on behalf of both clients, until a match within
the company’s accept ante interval for one of the clients is found. Overlapping accept ante
intervals are not a concern in this case since the clients are not in (potential) competition
with each other; a capital goods firm that is a good match for both clients can buy from
one and sell to the other.
The preceding paragraph begs the question, if general trading companies make such
good economic sense, why are they not more prevalent? One possible explanation is that
large, diversified trading firms typically cannot succeed because of the same problem that,
according to Granovet ter (1995, Chapter 10 and Afterword), makes large government
employment services ineffective: the quality of information possessed about the client is
inadequate compared to the information possessed by the client herself or by her friends,
In the 1980s the government of Turkey passed legislation encouraging the formation of
foreign trade companies (FTCS) in imitation of the Japanese and Korean general trading14
companies, and Krueger and Aktan (1992, p. 165) report on the basis of their interviews
with Turkish manufacturers that “frequently heard were complaints that FTC
representatives abroad did not have enough knowledge of their products to be effective
salesmen. ” Possibly general trading companies can ordy flourish within the East Asian
style of doing business that emphasizes close long-term relationships. Jameson (1994)
states, “Perhaps most fundamental to shosha is the intimacy and the history of business
relationships built up over generations. ” Specialized trading firms, in contrast, can survive
merely through providing a straightforward “middleman” service using industry-specific
knowledge of the type described above, and do not depend on economies of scope in search
to be cost-effective.
In this connection it is worth noting that the Korean general trading companies
were formed by pre-existing business groups called chaebol (Lee, pp. 3-4), largely
eliminating the need for costly investment in “ties”. The sogo shosha are also affiliated
with business groups: Imai (1989, p. 135) notes that Japanese business groups have “a
general trading company at the core of the group engaged in information exchange between
both buyers and sellers. ” However, if one investigates further it becomes clear that Mit sti
Bussan and Mitsubishi Shoj, the oldest and largest sogo shosha, initiated the
diversification of their zaibatsu (as the pre-World War II Japanese business groups were
called) into production of differentiated manufactured goods. Sakamoto (1990, p. 54)
stat es that, “The conglomerate e form of zaibatiu can be said to have been born with Mit sui
Bussan’s commercial operations as its midwife, ” and goes on to describe (pp. 62-63) how,
for example, Mitsui came to dominate Japan’s exports of cotton yarn and cloth by forging
ties with independent spinning and weaving companies. 10 Nevertheless, both Mitsui and
Mitsubishi benefited from implicit government subsidies during the years when they were
10T~s occurred before World war I. During the interwar years, Mitsti Bussan “had small
and medium-sized industries organize themselves and produce bicycles, woolen goods, knit
goods, and shell buttons” (Sakamoto 1990, p. 75).15
making their initial investments in ties: Yoshino and Lifson report that “The first major
boost to [Mitsui] Bussan came in the form of the exclusive right to export the output of the
richest government-owned coal mine” (p. 11) and “The business began in shipping, but like
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, even more actively, moved into mining in 1873 under the patronage of
the government” (p. 15). It may be significant that a third sogo shosha (Suzuki) that by
the end of World War I achieved a size comparable to that of Mitsui and Mitsubishi
subsequently collapsed; according to Yoshino and Lifson (p. 19) “Suzuki did not have
access to the highly profitable fining ventures that Mitsui and Mitsubishi enjoyed through
political patronage. ”
My analysis comparing the efficiency of search by general trading companies to that
of firms’ own search suggests the following tentative conclusion. Economies of scope
realized by general trading companies dominate the cost of “maintaining” ties that firms
conducting their own search do not have to bear (because they are automatically aware of
changes in their own product lines), but not the cost of building ties from the ground up.
The East Asian success with general trading companies then reflects their governments’
willingness to provide start-up subsidies rather than unique cultural attributes. 11
General trading companies may be hampered by an additional diffictity in realizing
economies of scope in search. Suppose that, for any potential company client, there
typically exists another firm in the same country-industry with an overlapping accept ante
interval. Suppose further that the mat ch that the general t rad.ing company identifies for
its client act ually occurs within the intersection of the two accept ante intervals. It might
be possible for the other firm to free-ride on this search and compete for the buyer’s
business, thereby devaluing the outcome of the search. 12 The strategy of free-riding might
llThe World Bank (1994, p. 112) states that, “Taiwanese LTCS [Large Trading Companies],
however, never really took off in part because government incentives to LTCS were very
modest”.
lzIn the previous section it was implicitly assumed that if this situation arose, either (1) the
firm whose search was successful is able to prevent free-riding through secrecy, a long-term
exclusive cent ract, or other means, or (2) codes of behavior embedded in the notion of a16
dominate the strategy of being a general trading company client. Indeed, it might
dominate the strategy of engaging in any form of search for foreign buyers. This issue is
taken up in full in the following section.
VI. Search and SpiJlovers, and Policy Responses
How much potential exists for firms to free-ride on the searches of other firms for
foreign buyers? We do not know how typical it is for country-industries to be sufficiently
densely supplied in a particular part of characteristics space to create overlapping
accept ante intervals. We do know that international trade leaves a paper trail of customs
documents and involves movement of goods and people in and out of international (and
thus highly visible) seaports and airports. (Though we have pushed aside the issue of
mutual adaptation between seller and buyer for this paper, it is worth noting in passing
that much of this will involve translation of documents and conformance with regulations
and standards that are easily transferred to a competing supplier from the same country. )
When legal means are inadequate, free-riding may be accomplished by illegal means.
McDermott (1994, p. 32) states, citing a study conducted for the American Society of
Industrial Security, that “the most common target for corporate spies is customer lists”.
We are also informed by Egan and Mody (1992, pp. 326-7) that, at least when more
developed country buyers are detiing with less developed country sellers, buyers prefer
renewable short -t erm (annual) cent racts, rat her than long-term contracts that would
prevent free-riding, In any case, my tim in this section is to show that it is much easier to
understand the ubiquity of certain government policies if we think of them as responses to
the potential for firms to free-ride on the successful searches of other firms for foreign
buyers.
Let us consider the case where firms in a given country-industry find it worthwhile
“tie” prevent free-riding.17
to engage in search for foreign buyers in the absence of potential free-riding but do not find
search worthwhile in the presence of potential free-riding. 13 One possible policy response
to this problem is to subsidize search, Indeed, most governments do this by, among other
things, sponsoring trade missions. Of twelve countries studied by Seringhaus and Rosson
(1990, chapter 2), only West Germany and Austria did not provide formal government
support for trade missions, leaving their organization and financing to chambers of
commerce and industry associations instead. In recent years the Japanese government had
also withdrawn from export promotion, leaving this to the Federation of Japanese
Industries, which includes the sogo shosha. (The other nine countries were Australia,
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.)
Hibbert (1985, p. 141) lists a number of areas in which trade missions can play a
positive role. At the top of Ms list are “facilitating market research” and “participants
collectively devoting more effort to market investigation”. 11 Consider also this detailed
description of the programs sponsored by the state-owned French Insurance Company for
Foreign Trade (COFACE), given by Nothdurft (1992, pp. 46-47):
To encourage SMES [small-to-medium-size enterprises] to develop overseas
markets, COFACE will reimburse 50 percent (more in difficult markets) of the
costs of two individual missions by up to three company executives for as long
as two weeks. More significant y, for an annual premium equal to 1.5 percent
of an SME’S market exploration budget, COF ACE will guarantee from 50 to
60 percent of the cost of market exploration activities, up to approximate ely
$160,000, if subsequent export income from the target market fails to cover
R&D costs. Repayment is graduated over six years to keep pace with
anticipated business growth. A similar program for large firms guarantees up
to 75 percent with repayment over ten years. According to one COFACE
IsEven if these firms find search worthwhile in the presence of free-riding, they may delay
search if there is a first-mover disadvantage. The first mover has the obvious disadvantage
of incurring search costs, but also has the advantage of searching wit bin its own accept ante
intervti rather than (effectively) searching within the acceptance interval of another firm.
For a discussion of “excess inertia” when there is first -mover disadvantage see Farrell and
Sdoner (1986).
llAt the bottom of Hibbert’s list is “providing beneficial intra-group exchanges and contacts
for experienced exporters”. This suggests that another purpose of trade missions is to
substitute for social capital, or even to build social capital.18
official, some 6,000 firms have participated in this guarantee program, and
two-thirds have been either wholly or partly successful.
Thus it seems clear that government support of trade missions is a response to what is
considered inadequate search by domestic firms, but whether it is perceived as inadequate
because of potential free-riding or only in light of some mercantilist goal is not clear.
Another means of subsidizing search is the creation of government entities intended
to function much like the general trading companies discussed in the previous section.
Consider the following example from the Emilia-Romagna region of Northern Italy,
described by Nothdurft (1992, p. 36):
The Service Center for the Export Development of Emilia-Romagna Firms, or
SVEX, was created in 1989 jointly by ERVET, the regional chamber of
commerce, and the production associations for small, medium, large, and
artisan firms ....Operating on the assumption that Italian firms need no help in
penetrating European markets, SVEX researches unt appeal but potentially
important difficult markets such as the former Soviet Union, India, and Japan.
It conducts a detailed market analysis; finds an appropriate political, cultural,
or trade event to promote the region’s firms; organizes a group of firms
interested in and capable of trading with the target country; invites officials
from that country to visit the firms in Emilia-Romagna; and eventually
establishes a permanent presence in that market, typically an overseas
national under contract to SVEX. In addition to representing individual firms
and groups of firms, SVEX is, in effect, a service center for service centers in
the region’s other sectors.
Even if trade missions and other market exploration programs are successful in
countering the disincentives to search created by potential free-riding, because they do not
prevent free-riding they may not be cost-effective from the point of view of the sponsoring
government. Free-riding weakens the bargaining power of the domestic firms vis-a-vis the
foreign buyer and may therefore reduce the total domestic share of the surplus below what
one firm would have obtained in the absence of free-riding. In this connection it is worth
noting a comment by Hibbert (1990, p. 226) that missions that represent only one industry
rather than a range of industries “are not always popular among businessmen who find
themselves competing against each other overseas (calling on the same buyers, promoting
similar products, etc. )“.19
One way to prevent free-riding is for governments to allow firms that identify and
supply foreign buyers to apply for a monopoly export license to fill orders for its type of
product (s) coming from that buyer. Such a policy, however, would shut out desirable
competition in the case of bad performance by the holders of the licenses. For this reason
such a licensing system may act as a competitive disadvantage for the country’s sellers
vis - a-vis sellers in other country-industries. Nevert heless, countries t hat license exports
with other policy objectives in mind may attempt to discourage free-riding more informa~y
through their administrative oversight of the licensing process. Clearly more research is
required here, both to identify the optimal policy response to the problem of potential
free-riding on the search of others and to discover the extent to which current government
policies may be understood as responses to this problem.
W. Conclusions
In this paper I have explored some of the implications of a network/search view of
trade in differentiated products for microeconornic aspects of trading behavior. I have
shown that this view can explain the importance of ethnic and extended family ties in
trade, the success of diversified trading intermediaries such as Japan’s sogo shosha, and the
ubiquity of government export promotion policies such as subsidized trade missions. A
whole set of government trade policies aimed at subsidizing search, a set heretofore ignored
by trade theorists, has been opened up for formal welfare analysis. At the same time, it
must be recognized that alternative explanations etist for all of these phenomena, some of
which undoubtedly account for at least part of what we observe, and that more research is
needed to evaluate the relative importance of the explanations I have given here. It is
doubtful that studies using data on bilateral trade flows such as Gould (1994) can be
anything more than suggestive. What will be needed is comparative case studies done with
the ideas presented here in mind.
Much more could be learned about trade and search by dropping the limitations of20
the partial equilibrium approach I have pursued in this paper. For example, Gereffi (1994)
has argued that when sellers are less developed country manufacturers the most important
search activity is conducted by (more developed country) buyers, yet I have assumed
throughout that foreign buyers are passive in the sense that they do not engage in search
activity of their own. This prevented me horn analyzing phenomena such as trade fairs,
which appear to attract foreign buyers in part by reducing their search costs. is To properly
incorporate actively searching foreign buyers as well as domestic sellers, however, one
shotid move from a search model to a mat thing model, thereby greatly increasing the
complexity of the analysis. Ultimately the goal should be a general equilibrium model in
which search and networks on the one hand and competitively determined market prices on
the other are both sources of information for traders.
lsThe advantages of seller clustering to buyers searchin for a differentiated product has
r already been recognized by conventional search theory where “ties” between searchers
play no role); see, e.g., Stuart (1979).21
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Figure 3